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Federal Securities Laws Should
Protect Some Purchases of All
or Substantially All of a
Corporation's Stock
Robert N. Rapp*
The federal securities laws were designedto protect purchasers of securities by
ensuring adequate disclosure of materialinformation regardingthe security, issuer,
and selling intermediaries. The author notes that a series of recentfederal court
decisionshasformulateda virtualper se rule disallowing application of thefederal
securitieslawprotectionsto transactionsinvolvingthepurchaseof allorsubstantially
all the stock of a business. Although literallysuch "stock" would be subject to the
securitieslawprotectionsdue to its inclusion in the statutorydefinition of 'Security,"
these recent decisionshave heldthat acquisition ofsubstantiallyall of the stock of a
business conveys enough management control that disclosure andantifraudproteclion under the Acts is not warranted The author examines the emergent trendcreated by these decisions as well as Golden v. Garofolo, a Second Circuitdecision
which manifests a strong contrary reaction. He also examines the congressionalintent behind/federalsecuritieslawprotectionsand the true economic realityof investment decisionmakingemployed in thepurchaseofallor substantiallyallthe stock of
a business. The authorconcludes that the analysis employed in the recent trendof
decisionsandthe emergence of a virtualperse rule contradictfundamentalpremises
for federalsecurities law protections. He reasons that acquisition of management
control,ratherthan being the determinativefactorin denying securitieslawprotections,is itselfa criticalfactorin making an investment decision--one which is vulnerable to informationfailure and which consequently requiresfederal securities law
protection.
INTRODUCTION

FEW ISSUES .of securities law have seen such rapid development as the issue of whether acquisitions in negotiated transactions of all or substantially all of the issuer's outstanding stock are
* The author is a partner at Calfee, Halter & Griswold, Cleveland, Ohio and is a
Lecturer In Law at Cleveland State University College of Law. A.B. (1969), J.D. (1972),
Case Western Reserve University.
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covered by the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933
(1933 Act)' and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).2 In a
series of recent decisions, some courts have refused to recognize
securities law antifraud claims asserted by purchasers in such negotiated transactions, where, presumably, the acquisition represents the right to control the business enterprise. Shunning
"literal" application of the securities laws 3 and relying instead on
perceived "economic reality," these courts have decided that
purchase of all or substantially all the stock of a corporation is
really a purchase of the business for consumption and not a
purchase of an investment "security" to which federal securities
law 'applies. In the leading case of Frederiksen v. Poloway,4 the
Seventh Circuit succinctly articulated the "economic reality"
perceived:
[T]he transaction did not involve a sale of corporate stock to
raise capital for profit-making purposes. The plaintiffs sought
to acquire NSM's business in its entirety. The "stock" sale was
a method used to vest ECC with ownership of that business.
There was no offer of investment "securities." The stock of
NSM merely was passed incidentally as an indicia of ownership of the business assets sold to ECC.5
Cases in the Frederiksen trend rest squarely on the premise
that purchase of all or substantially all of the corporation's stock
represents the antithesis of investment, because the presumed motivation is to "use or consume the item purchased." 6 Obtaining
control gives the purchaser the power to translate his motivation
into corporate policy. The Frederiksen court and later courts have
supported this premise by applying the traditional "investment
contract" analysis set forth in SEC v. W.J Howey Co. ,' updated to
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The focus of this Article will be
limited to the investor protections provided by the general antifraud provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts. Although this Article does not analyze the federal securities law protections
provided by the registration and reporting requirements of the Acts, many of the policies
which compel the application of the antifraud provisions would also mandate compliance
with the itemized disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws.
...
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15
3. "The term 'security' means any ... stock.
U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10)
(1976).
4. 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1981).
5. Id. at 1151-52.
6. Id. at 1150 (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-53
(1975)). In Forman the Court contrasted such a motivation with that in which an "investor" is attracted solely by the prospects of a return on his investment. 421 U.S. at 853.
7. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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reflect the "economic reality" theme of United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.8 The resultant analysis is dangerously close
to a per se rule denying federal securities law protection to acquisitions of all or substantially all the stock of a corporation.
The thesis of this Article is that cases in the Frederiksen trend
which have left the impression of a per se rule are wrong. The
antifraud protections of federal securities laws should be available
in cases of acquisition of all or substantially all of a corporation's
stock, where circumstances demonstrate the need for such protection by the presence of factors which the securities laws were intended to address. The advancement, moreover, of any per se rule
of law based upon the reasoning and analysis offered in the current spate of decisions is actually antagonistic to most of the considerations heretofore justifying the availability of federal
securities law protections. Such a rule is also at odds with a major
premise underlying the creation of the liberalized antifraud protections in the first place. As demonstrated in the ensuing analysis, there are undoubtedly business acquisitions in which the facts
and circumstances demand securities law protections. Indeed, the
Second Circuit recently countered the Frederiksen trend and rejected the "sale of a business" doctrine which would have precluded securities law protections.9 At the same time, however, it is
equally clear that circumstances may demonstrate the absolute
propriety of not affording such protections.
I.

THE "ECONOMIC REALITY" CONUNDRUM

The literal language of the 1933 and 1934 Acts strongly supports the inclusion of purchase of all or substantially all of a corporation's stock within the statutory definiton of "security." The
United States Supreme Court has said that the definition of "security"' 0 includes two broad categories of items: traditional, stan8. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
9. Golden v. Garofolo, [current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,656, at 93,275 (2d
Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
10. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976), provides in
part:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires(1) the term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, votingtrust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest
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dardized instruments like "stocks," "bonds," and "notes"; and
instruments like "investment contracts" and "transferable
shares."'" While the substance of the transaction, not its form,
will determine whether a particular item is a "security,"' 2 the
Supreme Court has in the past included instruments falling within
the literal language of the statute.' 3 Thus, the purely statutory
ground for extending the protection of the federal securities laws
to acquisitions of all or substantially all a corporation's stock, that
is, literal coverage, is certain.
Reaffirming the commitment to maximizing the investor protections of the federal securities laws, the Court in SEC v. W.J
Howey Co., 4 set in motion the expansion of the scope of securities
law coverage characterizing the past four pre-Frederiksendecades.
This expansion was accomplished through interpretation of the
descriptive statutory definition of "investment contract" in light of
the transaction's substance. The Howey Court stated:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it
being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by normal interests in the physor participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
11. In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943), the Court said:
In the Securities Act the term "security" was defined to include by name or
description many documents in which there is common trading for speculation or
investment. Some, such as notes, bonds and stocks, are pretty much standardized
and the name alone carries well settled-meaning. Others are of more variable
character and were necessarily designated by more descriptive forms, such as
"transferable share," "investment contract," and "in general any interest or instrument commonly known as a security." We cannot read out of the statute
these general descriptive designations merely because more specific ones have
been used to reach some kinds of documents .... However, the reach of the Act
does not stop with the obvious and commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reached if it be proved as a
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of
dealing which established their character in commerce as "investment contracts,"
or as "any interest or instrument commonly known as a security."
12. The United States Supreme Court, in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336
(1967) stated: "[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the Act[s],
form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic
reality."
13. The JoinerLeasing Corp. Court said: "Instruments may be included within any of
these definitions, as a matter of law, if on their face they answer to the name or description." 320 U.S. at 351.
14. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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ical assets employed in the enterprise.

While the now familiar Howey rule assured application of federal securities law protections to the novel, uncommon, or irregular device, and achieved high visibility in the process, little
substantive attention was ever focused upon reasons for the
rule-the circumstances which justified specialized protection.
Application of the Howey "test" became virtually mechanical.

The argument that the statutory meaning of "stock" required
inclusion of substantial or total stock acquisitions within the term
"security" seemed to have unassailable merit, particularly when

buttressed analogically by the expansion of securities protections
through the Howey definition of "investment contract." In 1975,
however, the Supreme Court removed from the definition of "se-

curity" an instrument which on its face proclaimed to be

"stock"-one of the specific instruments which the Supreme Court
previously had noted were "pretty much standardized" with "the
name alone carr[ying] well-settled meaning."' 6
In UnitedHousing Foundation,Inc. v. Forman,t7 the Supreme
Court decided that shares of "stock" in a state-spofisored housing
cooperative were not "securities" entitled to federal protection,

even though clearly within the literal language of the federal statute. The "stock" involved in Forman represented the right to reside in the project and had no traditional attributes of corporate
stock. 8 The definitional provisions of both the 1933 and 1934
Acts provide that "security" includes the various enumerated in15. Id. at 298-99. The Howey Court's definition of "investment contract" was expressly recognized by the Court to reflect economic reality. As the Court observed,
[The term "investment contract"] was common in many state "blue sky" laws in
existence prior to the adoption of the federal statute and, although the term was
also undefined by the state laws, it had been broadly construed by statecourts so
as to afford the investing public a full measure of protection. Form was disregardedforsubstance and emphasis was placedupon economic reality.
Id. at 298 (emphasis added). Contrary to what later cases imply-particularly those denying the protections of federal securities laws to purchasers of all or substantially all a corporation's stock-the emphasis in Forman on "economic reality" represented no change of
focus from Howey, only a change in result. The new aspect was to apply "economic reality" to defeat the existence of a security rather than fihd one. See infra notes 17-25 and
accompanying text.
16. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. at 351. But see discussion concerning "notes" as
securities in infra note 72 and accompanying text.
17. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
18. The Forman Court listed what it believed were some of the traditional attributes
of stock-the right to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits: negotiability, ability to be pledged or hypothecated, the right to vote in proportion to the
number of shares owned, and the appreciation of stock value. Id. at 851. See infra text
accompanying note 22.
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struments "unless the context otherwise requires."'9 To avoid the
result so clearly commanded by the express statutory inclusion of
"stock" in the definition of "security, ' 2° the Court interpreted the
"unless the context otherwise requires" statutory language to govern all the enumerated definitions of "security." Viewing "context" as subtending both the facts of the transaction and the later
text of the statute, the Forman Court found the facts of the transaction to show that the purchasers of the "stock" were motivated
to acquire only a place to live:
Common sense suggests that people who intend to acquire only
a residential apartment in a state-subsidized cooperative, for
their personal use, are not likely to believe that in reality they
are purchasing investment securities simply because the transaction is evidenced by something called a share of stock. These
shares have none of the characteristics "thatin our commercial
worldfall within the ordinary concept of a security."'"
Thus, the Court signalled economic reality in the commercial
world as the test for a "security": "Because securities transactions
lare economic in character Congress intended the application of
these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended thereto. 22 The economic
reality of Forman was consumption of housing for personal use
rather than for investment. The shares in the cooperative lacked
voting rights, cash dividend rights, rights to pledge or hypothecate, and the right to potential appreciation.2 3 Therefore, the
Court found the shares to lack the characteristics which in the
commercial world fall within the concept of a "security."
As an alternative theory, the claimants in Forman asserted that
an "investment contract" could be found in the circumstances by
applying the Howey test. The Court disagreed, concluding that
the situation offered no "expectation of profits" in the sense found
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(l) (1933 Act), 78a(c)(10) (1934 Act) (1976) (emphasis added).
20. See supra note 10.
21. 421 U.S. at 851 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1933)).
22. 421 U.S. at 849.
23. The undisputed purpose of the shares of "stock" involved in this case was the right
to occupy an apartment in the housing project. The shares were nontransferable and upon
terminatiori of occupancy could only be reoffered to the cooperative, or to an eligible new
tenant in the event repurchase was declined, at the initial price paid, making the initial
purchase price, in actuality, merely a recoverable security deposit. Clearly, the claimants
did not purchase the "stock" with an expectation of realizing an investment profit from the
housing stock. The presence or absence of such an expectation is critical in the inquiry.
See Rapp, The Role of PromotionalCharacteristicsin Determining the Existence of a Security, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 26 (1981).
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necessary in Howey and, accordingly, involved no investment
contract.24
While discarding wooden literalism in favor of transactional
substance, the Court was, nevertheless, careful to point out:
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly irrelevant to
the decision whether it is a security. There may be occasions
when the use of a traditional name such as "stocks" or "bonds"
will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply. This would clearly be the case when the
underlying transaction embodies some of the significant characteristics typically associated with the named instrument.2 5
Later decisions, however, unfortunately have not followed Forman's clear warning. Using Forman as a talisman, later courts
have denied federal securities law protections to purchases of all
or substantially all stock of a corporation-even where "economic
realities" compel quite the opposite result.
In searching for "economic reality," the test should be whether
the facts of the transaction demonstrate that the purchaser's expectations were investment or consumption. While courts have no
principled way to prefer the expectations of one of the parties over
the other, Congress-in which both purchasers and sellers of securities are represented-has decreed that expectations of purchasers be preferred. The federal securities laws were adopted in
response to demonstrated abuses. Of particular concern was purchasers' inability to obtain access to full information. The
Supreme Court has construed the 1933 Act to prefer the expectations of purchasers:
While a buyer and seller of securities, under some circum-"
stances, may deal at arm's length on equal terms, it is clear that
the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages
under which buyers labor. Issuers of and dealers in securities
have better opportunities to investigate and appraise the pro24. The Forman Court described that expectation of profits:
By profits, the Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment. . . or a participation in earnings resulting
from the use of investors' funds . . . . In such cases the investor is "attracted
solely by the prospects of a return" on his investment. . . . By contrast, when a
purchaser is motivated by a desire to use or consume the item purchased--"to
occupy the land or to develop it themselves," as the Howey court put it.. .- the

securities laws do not apply.

...

In the present case there can be no doubt that investors were attracted solely
by the prospect of acquiring a place to live, and not by financial returns on their
investments.
421 U.S. at 852-53 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 300).
25. 421 U.S. at 850-51.
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spective earnings and business plans affecting securities than
buyers. It is therefore reasonable for Congress to put buyers of
securities covered by that Act on a different basis from other
purchasers.2 6
These concerns have not been limited to the public distribution of
securities or to any particular setting. Indeed as the Supreme
Court, in considering the scope of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,27 later observed:
"[W]e read § 10(b) to mean that Congress meant to bar deceptive

devices and contrivances in the purchase or sale of securities

whether conducted in the organized markets or face to face." 2 8
Furthermore, Forman teaches that an integral part of the factual
assessment of the deal is the purchaser's legitimate expectation.2 9
The decision to acquire a personal residence was not an investment decision protected by the securities laws because the buyers
did not believe that "in reality" they were purchasing investment
securities.3 0 The purchase of all outstanding corporate stock,
however-stock in the truest and most traditional sense-may in-

volve entirely different investor expectations and may well occur
in circumstances requiring federal securities law protections.

II.

EMERGENT CASE LAW

No uniform interpretation of Forman has emerged from suc26. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953). The precise issue in Wilke was whether
an agreement to arbitrate claims could preclude assertion of securities law claims in Federal Court. Holding that such agreements could not extinguish the right to a federal adjudication as provided for in the Securities Act of 1933, the Court's analysis turned almost
exclusively upon the special protections afforded the buyers of securities which was shown
to be the intent of the Act.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). Section 10(b) outlaws the
use "in connection with the purchase or sale" of any security of "any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance." Additionally, pursuant to its rulemaking authority under
§ 10(b), the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated Rule lOb-5, which
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
28. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
29. 421 U.S. at 848-51.
30. Id. at 851.
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ceeding decisions. Some courts have merely failed to discuss the
admonition in Forman that where the underlying transaction

"embodies some of the significant characteristics typically associated with the named instrument,"'3 t the securities laws may properly apply.
Other courts, however, have rejected the view that federal securities laws may be applied based solely on the characteristics of

the instrument and have required "economic reality" analysis in
all cases. Yet these courts have gone one step further and con-

fined the economic reality analysis to the Howey factors, in effect
blurring and blending the economic reality holding of Forman

with its alternative holding that no Howey investment contract existed. In Frederiksenv. Poloway,32 the Seventh Circuit offered this
observation: "Our reading of Forman is that an "economic reality" assessment might be required by Forman even if the stocks

involved do have some characteristics typically associated with investment securities. 33
According to Frederiksen, the implication in Forman is that

"the economic reality of a transaction is always a key issue."3 4 In
31. Id.
32. 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1981).
33. Id. at 1152 n.2.
34. Id. To hold otherwise, according to the court, would ignore the fundamental admonition of Forman that securities transactions are "economic in character" and that the
intended applications of the securities laws turn upon the economic realities of a transaction. Frederiksen and its progeny emphasize that "stock" for purposes of securities law
coverage means stock utilized in the traditional capitalformationsetting--"the sale of corporate stock to raise capital for profit-making purposes." Id. at 1151. Forman itself fueled
that conclusion:
The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate serious
abuses in a largely unregulated securities market. The focus of the Acts is on the
capital market of the enterprise system: the sale of securities to raise capital for
profit-making purposes, the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the
need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the interest of investors.
421 U.S. at 849.
The narrow focus upon capital formation activity, however, has never been, and surely
could not be, the controlling principle in defining the ambit of securities law protections.
Indeed the Supreme Court has itself emphasized after Forman that even within the 1933
Act the protective focus is much broader, and that the antifraud provisions, particularly
section 17(a) of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976), represent a "major departure" from any
such limitation in scope. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778 (1979). See also S.
REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., IstSess. 4 (1933) (fraud or deception in the sale of securities may
be prosecuted regardless of whether the security is old or new).
Despite the focus upon capital formation at the primary distribution stage, it is clear
that the fundamental concern of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and its antifraud
protections, is protection in the transactional setting as opposed to the distributional setting. See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 130-31 (2d ed. 1961). None of the cases after
Frederiktsen have considered the distinction in transactional focus. Yet, it necessarily bears
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determining "economic reality," however, the Frederiksen court
simply imported the Howey test for investment contracts focusing
on profits from efforts of others. The elements for a "security" are
(1) an investment in a common venture (2) premised on a reasonable expectation of profits (3) to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.3 This test leads
inescapably to the conclusion that the assumption of managerial
control over the business enterprise and its future "profits" invariably defeats the contention that one has purchased a "security,"
because the expected profits would always be derived from the
managerial efforts of the purchaser. Such a result occurs regardless of the particular facts of the deal, access of the parties to
material information, and real expectations of the purchaser-regardless, in short, of economic reality. The analysis is
simplistic and invites the emergence of a per se rule; it is fundamentally erroneous applied to the purchase of all or substantially
all the outstanding stock of a corporation.
Forman itself is ambiguous as to whether stock possessing
traditional or typical characteristics was intended to be exempted
from economic reality analysis or whether all instruments are to
be subjected to such analysis before securities laws may apply. On
the one hand, the Court said that the federal securities laws would
clearly apply "when the underlying transaction embodies some of
the significant characteristics typically associated with the named
instrument. ' 36 But since the typical significant characteristics
were missing in Forman, this statement by the Court is dictum.
Further undercutting this dictum, the Court, discussing the alternative "investment contract" argument, said that the Howey test
"embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the
Court's decisions defining a security." 37 The Court also added:
upon the policy analysis employed in the inquiry, and its absence is further evidence of the
inadequate reasoning employed to achieve the current per se oriented results.
35. 637 F.2d at 1152. See also Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
36. 421 U.S. at 851.
37. Id. at 852 (emphasis added). This observation, however, must be considered from
the proper perspective. "All" of the Court's pre-Formandecisions defining a security relied
upon the proposition that a particular set of circumstances gave rise to the existence of an
investment contract. After Joiner and Howey, the Court in the next two decades decided
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (variable annuity contract held
to be an investment contract); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967)
("flexible fund" annuity contract held to be an investment contract); and Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) ("withdrawable capital shares" of a savings and loan association held to be investment contracts). The focus in all these cases was whether the essential
attributes of an investment contract, as outlined in Howey, were presented. The Court
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The touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common
venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be
derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of

others. By profits, the Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment
• . . or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors funds . .
In such cases the investor is "attracted
solely by the prospects of a return" on his investment. . .. By

contrast, when a purchaser is motivated by a desire to use or
the item purchased . . . the securities laws do not
consume
38

apply.

Frederiksen and some later cases such as Canfield v. Rapp &

Son, Inc. ,39 have simply concluded that since the Howey elements
sum up and entrap the notion of economic reality, the Howey element of "expectation of profits from efforts of others" must exist-as a matter of economic reality-in every security transaction.
That requirement is necessary in the emergent line of reasoning
even if, as in Canfield, the stock involved possesses traditional attributes of corporate stock. As that court reasoned:
answered affirmatively in each case. In each case policy analysis--the need for securities
law protections in each set of circumstances-was prominent. It is also noteworthy that in
Tcherepnin, the Court specifically noted that while all of the essential attributes of an investment contract were in evidence, the decision that a "security" was involved could also
be based upon the Joiner principle that "[i]nstruments may be included within any of [the
Act's] definitions, as a matter of law, if on their face they answer to the name or description." 389 U.S. at 339 (quoting Joiner, 320 U.S. at 351).
Thus, as pointed out in Forman, and now taken on faith in the emergent line, the
"touchstone" test of Howey ran through all of the Court's prior decisions. The question of
whether something which unquestionably answered to the name or description of a specifically identified category of security was never before the Court in any of those cases, however, and was not in the subsequent analysis. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (interest in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan held
not to constitute an investment contract). Moreover, in Daniel, the Court once again emphasized that "[t]he starting point in every case involving the construction of a statute is the
language itself." -d. at 558. Acknowledging the omission of any reference to pension plan
interests in either of the statutory definitions of "security," the Court went on in Daniel to
consider the contention that the set of relationships involved gave rise to the existence of an
investment contract.
Considering "all" of the decisions, the bifurcated analysis in Forman, and the considerable attention paid to what would "clearly" be the case when the instrument involved embodies significant characteristics typically associated with that instrument, is meaningful.
The fact is that both parts of the Forman opinion are, independently, in accord with "all"
prior decisions of the Court, and their unification in the emergent cases is neither undertaken in Forman nor logically compelled by anything contained in the opinion. None of
the emergent lower court cases has demonstrated any sensitivity to this perspective on the
words of Forman.
38. 421 U.S. at 852 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 300).
39. 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981). The author is unrelated to the defendant. See also
King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1982).
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[W]hile the stock purchased by Rapp had the characteristics of
ordinary stock, such as the right to receive dividends and voting
rights, in the hands of Rapp, this stock was not ordinary capital
stock.

Unlike the ordinary investor in ordinary capital stock, Rapp
acquired total control over those very characteristics-dividends and votes. When a purchaser acquires 100% of
the stock of a corporation and, therefore, for example, can confer dividends on itself at will, the fact that dividends are a characteristic of ordinary capital stock does not give rise to a
justifiable assumption that the federal securities laws apply.40
Other cases composing the emergent line, such as Chandler v.
Kew,4 1 Bula v. Manijfeld,4 2 and Dueker v. Turner,4 3 have simply
and erroneously equated bulk purchase of all assets of a business
with the purchase of 100% of the capital stock of the business entity, which represents ownership of those assets along with the
business (and, of course, its liabilities). Under this approach the
stock represents a mere indicia of ownership of the business. As
stated in Chandler.The economic realities of the case at bar show that the

plaintiff was buying a liquor store and, incidentially as an indicia of ownership, was receiving 100% of the stock of the company which owned the store. There was no44security transaction
within the purview of the federal statutes.

40. 654 F.2d at 466 n.7 (emphasis added). The italicized language clearly stands for
the proposition that in the hands of an "ordinary investor" the stock, with its traditional
attributes, would trigger securities law protections. The basis for distinguishing between
this particular purchaser and the "ordinary" investor is solely the amount of stock
purchased and the degree of future control conferred. But, as this Article demonstrates,
acquiring a right to future managerial control of an enterprise has no bearing upon the
economic realities of the purchase transaction itself; the critical factor is an expectation of
making that future control meaningful.
41. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 96,966, at 96,053 (10th Cir.
1977).
42. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,964, at 96,051 (D. Colo.
1977).
43. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,386, at 97,535 (N.D.
Ga. 1979).
44. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,966, at 96,054 (10th Cir.
1977). The equation between an outright sale of assets and the purchase of 1001% of the
stock of a corporation was more readily made in these cases, which indeed were structured
as asset purchases, with the transfer of the stock being a "mere incident" of the main transaction. In Chandler, for example, the Court emphasized that "plaintiff made a contract
with the defendants for the purchase by him of 'described business and personal property
... called K.E.W. Inc. dba Chambers Liquors.... .' The contract says: 'PRICE TO INCLUDE: 100% of the outstanding issued stock of K.E.W......' Yet this approach has
recently been applied with equal force in situations such as Canfield in which the transaction involved only the sale of stock pursuant to a written stock purchase agreement. In the
name of economic reality the Canfield Court reasoned:
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Irrespective of where emphasis is placed, all of the cases necessarily adopt the view of Forman which conceives of economic reality
blurring
simply in terms of the Howey test, thereby erroneously
45
and blending the alternative holdings in Forman.
III.

CASE LAW APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC REALITY TEST
TO IDENTIFY INVESTMENT CHARACTERISTICS

The cases show the difficulty courts have in identifying the
characteristics which separate an investment transaction from all
others, thus creating the need for specialized protection of the federal securities laws. There is, however, one fundamental economic reality ignored by cases in the Frederiksen line which deny
federal securities law protection to purchases of all stock in a corporation on the grounds that such purchase entails complete ownership and managerial control.
The decision to purchase the corporate stock is based upon an
assessment of investment risk, which is determined by available
information as to the reasonable expectation and ability of the
purchaser to employ meaningfully its newly acquired management powers to maximizepost-acquisition "profits." Cases in the
Frederiksen line, however, have ignored the issue of whether such
control could affect the near-term future success of the enterprise
in any meaningful way. There is a vast difference between the
right of future control over an enterprise and the ability to make
that right mean anything. Furthermore, the significance of the
Here the parties labeled their contract an "Agreement for Sale of Stock of Twigg
Corporation." Pursuant to the Agreement, Rapp purchased 100% of the capital
stock of Twigg, not Twigg's assets. But, despite the facial differences between the
transaction here and in Frederiksen,an "economic reality" analysis of the transaction here indicates the sale of a business, not securities. Finding that a sale of
100% of the stock brings the transaction within the securities laws, while a sale of
assets plus 100% of the stock does not, exalts form over substance. The economic
reality test requires investigation beyond the parties' method of structuring the
transaction. Undoubtedly, when Rapp purchased 100% of the Twigg stock, Rapp
purchased the entire business. A separate sale of assets would have added nothing to the economic reality of the transaction.
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 198,227, at 91,534 (7th Cir. 1981).
Such analysis, of course, ignores fundamental economic reality that may be associated
with liabilities and risk flowing from acquisition of the stock thereof. Both before and after
Forman, such considerations for the chosen structure of a transaction-and the expectations associated with it-have been regarded as significant. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
Pat Ryan & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), ceri. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974);
Bailey v. Meister Bran, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. II1. 1970). See also Mifflin Energy
Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,734 (V.D.
Pa. 1980); see infra text accompanying notes 47-60.
45. But see supra note 37.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:595

control to be acquired is simply one more factor in the buyer's
valuation process-albeit a very important factor. Yet the buyer
is disadvantaged concerning the significance of control because
the source of such information can only be the seller. Thus, the
purchaser of all or most of the stock is in no different position
from the disadvantaged buyer whom the Supreme Court long ago
V observed was on a "different basis from other purchasers"4 6 in the
commercial world. Such a buyer is precisely the buyer the securities laws were designed to protect. The right to exercise managerial control over an enterprise in the future is meaningless, in
terms of economic reality, if the economic conditions of the enterprise have been misrepresented by the seller prior to the
transaction.
The recent cases moving against the Frederiksen trend by permitting application of securities law protections to 100% stock acquisitions have demonstrated some sensitivity on this point,
although they fail to articulate it. Thus these decisions are vulnerable to attacks of being impermissibly literal. In Titsch Printing
Co. v. Hastings,47 the United States District Court for Colorado
allowed application of federal securities law protections in the
case of a 100% stock acquisition. The Titsch Court refused to apply the Howey definition of investment contract in determining
whether the plainly denominated stock was a security. Thus, the
court rejected the notion that Forman imposed the Howey test
across the board. The court further reasoned:
Here we have the sale of two going concerns where the purchaser was buying not only the assets of the corporations, but
also the liabilities. The balance sheet of a company is prime
consideration that goes into the negotiating and eventual arrival at a purchase price. There is no question that in the event
of a material misrepresentation the defrauded purchasers have
an action for common law fraud. However, someone who
purchases shares of stock, whether it be 1 per cent or 100 per
cent, also has the reasonable expectation that he is a beneficiary
of protection afforded by the federal securities laws. The policy
behind the securities laws supports that expectation.48
46. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). See also Coffey, The EconomicRealitiesofA
"Security" Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 367, 396-98

(1967).
47. 456 F. Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978).
48. Id. at 449. Regarding the unified view of Forman the court stated:
The Court did not utilize the Howey test in part "A" when it determined that the
Co-Op City shares did not constitute "stock." Instead, the Court, in its analysis,
addressed those characteristics normally associated with the purchase of "stock"
in reaching its conclusion.
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Thus, the purchase of merely all the assets as assets differs from
the purchase of all the stock entailing an assessment of the corporation's debt structure in valuing the stock. Such an assessment is
not relevant to the purchase of assets at break-up value for consumption as assets.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals employed similar reasoning in refusing to apply the Howey test in a case where the
purchaser only acquired veto power through purchase of 50% of
the stock. In Coffin v. PolishingMachines, Inc.,4 9 the Fourth Circuit based its holding entirely upon the rejection of the Forman
view that requires analysis beyond notice that traditional corporate stock was involved. The court noted that the Howey test only
"applies to interests not easily recognized as securities in the capital markets,"5 and stated: "Absent some showing that ordinary
corporate stocks are other than what they appear to be, we need
not consider whether an investor will derive his profit from his
own efforts."'"
In Coffin, the purchaser's veto power as a 50% stockholder and
position as executive vice president were meaningless rights in
light of the information failure surrounding acquisition of those
rights. The corporation was actually insolvent and there was a
preexisting scheme for conversion of corporate assets. As a matter
of economic reality, it made little difference that the purchaser of
the stock would participate in the future management of the business upon discovering its insolvency.
Similarly, in Mfiin Energy Sources,Inc. v. Brooks, 2 the court
found the application of the Howey "economic reality" test unnecessary in the context of a "stock purchase agreement" and the
presence of corporate stock possessing all the traditional stock attributes. The court declared:
In this case, the substance of the sale is 100% of stock in a
business. This is clearly evidenced by the terms of the stock
purchase agreement. Ownership of the business is a by-product
of this transaction, but is not sufficient to remove what is clearly
expressed in the terms of the purchase and sale of stock from
the purview of the federal securities law. 3
Id. This Article has done the same.
49. 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1979).
50. Id. at 1204.
51. Id.
52. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1980).
53. Id. at 98,853.

97,734, at 98,851 (W.D. Pa.
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The court clearly indicated that the purchase of stock differs sub-

stantively from the purchase of physical assets, not the least of
which difference is the purchase of the debt structure of the
business.
In Bronstein v. Bronstein,5 4 the court recognized that despite

the control acquired by a purchaser of all the stock, the protections of the securities laws nevertheless applied because the purchaser's expectations were of "acquiring an interest in a profitmaking venture," 55 not "with an eye towards personal use or consumption of the underlying asset," 5 6 as in Forman. The court

wrote: "[T]his case involves a [plaintiff] who clearly purchased his
brother's stock in Penn Tower with the hope of realizing a return

commensurate with the success of the business. '57 The need for
securities law protections in Bronstein was further underscored because the plaintiff had purchased stock from his brother in reliance upon misrepresentations of internal facts concerning the

financial position of the company.
Bronstein went further than Titsch, Coffin, or Brooks by holding that purchase of corporate stock could not "possess. . . dual
characteristics"5 " of investment and consumption, but is an invest-

ment transaction by its very nature-the hope of realizing a return
commensurate with the success of the business. The court's broad

language, which would seem to cover a purchase of 100% of a
business' stock pursuant to a preexisting plan of liquidation, must
be read in its context: a rejection of the defense's trumpeting of
the analogical value of promissory note cases which held notes not
to be "securities" within the meaning of the Acts despite the literal
statutory inclusion of "notes" in the definition of "securities."
407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Id. at 930.
Id.
Id. at 93 1.
Id. The court observed:
The reason courts have become involved in determining whether a note constitutes a security under the Acts is because instruments denominated notes can be
either commercial or investment in nature. Shares of stock in a closely held family corporation do not possess such dual characteristics. Shareholders acquire
these shares not with an eye towards personal use or consumption of the underlying interest. . . but rather for the purpose of acquiring an interest in a profit
making venture. The Bronstein court also recognized that the scope of protections
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is not determined by a particular transactional setting, and that Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 should operate despite the
fact that the shares of the corporation involved were closely held by members of a
family and sold to another member of the family in a face-to-face transaction
"outside the organized securities markets."

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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Bronstein took the position that due to the very character of corporate stock, a 100% stock acquisition done without an eye to liquidation was entitled to securities laws protections. Thus the court
wrote that "[t]he federal securities laws are designed to protect investors, not persons engaged in ordinary consumer or commercial
loan transactions."5 9
The Bronstein court and other courts bucking the Frederiksen
trend reject a unified Forman/Howey "economic reality" analysis.
These courts read Forman strictly and separate the "economic reality" analysis from the alternative holding applying Howey to an
investment contract analysis. As Bronstein declared:
While the Howey test, especially the language "solely from the
efforts of others," has helped courts to identify the somewhat
elusive investment contract, its applicabilityto other less elusive
types ofsecurities is debatable. In any event, since stock, one of
the most common forms of securities, carried a traditional and
accepted meaning, it is not necessary ... for purposes of section 10(b) that Penn Tower stock meet the test used to identify
an investment contract. Indeed, the Forman decision strongly
suggests such a conclusion. The court in Forman applied the
Howvey test only in part "B" of its opinion, when it determined
that the Co-Op City shares were not "investment contracts."
By contrast, the Court did not utilize the Howey test in making
its earlier finding that the Co-Op City shares did not constitute
stock.6 °
The Bronstein Court's reading of Forman as embodying alternative holdings is correct. The "economic reality" of stock acquisition, whether 1% or 100%, cannot be defined exclusively in terms
of the Howey profits-from-efforts-of-others criterion, but must be
defined in terms of investment risk. In dicta, the Supreme Court
has recognized this point. In Rubin v. United States,61 the Court
was confronted with a criminal prosecution for alleged violation
of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 193362 in connection with
59. Id. at 930.

60. Id. at 929-30 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The court additionally observed that, carried to its logical extreme, the argument that stock is not a security where it
carries a right of participation in managerial control would necessarily deny security status
to any stock in the hands of one who is involved in management of a corporation-a result
that cannot possibly be justified given the entire history of federal securities regulation. See
id. at 931.
61. 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976). Section 17(a), a general antifraud provision, applicable to
the offer and sale of securities, declares:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
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the pledge of worthless securities as collateral for a loan. The precise question before the Court was whether a pledge of securities
in a loan transaction constituted a "sale" of the securities for purposes of coverage under the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws. The Court held that the antifraud provisions applied, and
Chief Justice Burger's opinion observed:
The economic considerations and realities present when a
lender parts with value and accepts securities as collateral security for a loan are similar in important respects to the risk an
investor undertakes when purchasing shares. Both are relying
on the value of the securitiesthemselves, andboth must be able to
dependon the representationsmade by the transferorofthe securitiesregardlessof whether the transferorpassesfulltitle or only a

conditional
and defeasible interest to secure repayment of a
63
loan.

The investment risk of purchasing any stock in a corporation is
that the shares are misvalued before the transaction due to information failure, thus depriving the purchaser of a true picture. Assumption of management control, so critical to a Howey finding of
nonsecurity status, is irrelevant to obtaining the knowledge before
the purchase by which to evaluate the risk/return characteristics
for the business's future. As Chief Justice Burger observed in
Rubin, prior to the transaction the investor relies "on the value of
(1)to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
The expansive scope of protection accorded by section 17(a) was highlighted by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979), where the Court rejected
the respondent's argument that the criminal antifraud protections of section 17(a) are unavailable to brokers because they are not "traditional" investors. In extending the federal
securities law protections to brokers as well as investors the Court seemed to rely upon the
legislative history of the 1933 Act which stated, "[tlhis legislation is designed to protect not
only the investing public but at the same time to protect honest corporate business." 441
U.S. at 776 (quoting S. REP.No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
Most recently, in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S.Ct. 1220 (1982), the Court reaffirmed
its view that the definition of "security" for purposes of Exchange Act antifraud protection
"is quite broad," and that the term ".... was meant to include the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security," specifically including "ordinary stocks." Id. at 1223. Yet the Court went on to point out that the
securities laws were not intended to provide a "broad federal remedy for all fraud," and
refused to hold that a certificate of deposit issued by a federally regulated bank was a
"security." Id. A critical factor in the determination was the scope of other regulation and
the absence of investment risk.
63. 449 U.S. at 451 (emphasis added).
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the securities themselves," and in that regard must be able to depend on the representations made by the seller-transferor. This is
investment risk. It is also economic reality. The "unified FormanIHowey interpretation" is incorrect.
While the unified Forman/Howey interpretation is incorrect,
so too is Bronstein's dicta that "stock" by nature is investment and
to be protected. Where parties to a transaction realistically bargain at arm's length, where access to material information and the
opportunity to investigate are meaningful, and where the relative
positions of the parties and the circumstances of the transaction
demonstrate the self-protection ability of the purchaser, then concern for investor protections may be nonexistent. The justification
for that conclusion is not that investors do not need protection
because they have acquired a right to future control; rather, the
purchaser may not be an "investor" in the sense of being dependent
upon the sellerfor disclosure of the materialfactsupon which risk
will be evaluatedandthe investment decision made.
The federal securities laws were intended to operate in certain
instances in the myriad of transactions where special protection is
needed over and above common law rights of fraud, contract, or
breach of warranty. They will protect a buyer against one with
superior knowledge of facts material to the exercise of investment
judgment. Even some courts which adopt the Howey test as the
general measure of "economic reality" of Forman (the unified Forman/Howey view), do not reject the notion that, under certain
circumstances, acquisitions of 100% of the stock in a corporation
can be an investment to be protected by the federal securities
laws. Golden v. Garofolo, 4 a case solidly within the Frederiksen
trend denying securities law protections to 100% stock acquisitions, said:
Plainly the post-Formandecisions relied upon by the parties
differ markedly over the proper interpretation to be given Forman. The issue is whether Forman adopts the Howey test as a
general "economic reality" test to be applied to all purported
securities, or whether Forman requires that instruments labelled or characterized as "stock" need only possess certain feainstruments to come
tures commonly associated with stock
65
within the ambit of the Federal Acts.
The Golden court aligned with the unified Forman/Howey in64. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,277, at 91,767
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd [current] FED.SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,656, at 93,275 (2d Cir. 1982).

See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
65. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

98,277, at 91,773.
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terpretation, but clearly recognized that Forman did deem characteristics commonly associate with the term "stock" material, but
only to the extent that the characteristics of an instrument "would
lead a purchaser or seller reasonably to believe the securities laws
would apply." 66 Thus, the Golden court relied heavily on the particular circumstances of the case:
Here ... despite the presence of the common features of
stock in the transferred shares, there was manifestly no reasonable reliance by plaintiffs upon coverage by the Acts. The undisputed facts indicate that the concern of the parties was the
transfer of a business, not the sale and purchase of stock. That
the deal took the form of a stock transfer was merely a technicality dictated by a provision in a lease [which forbade assignment]. Plaintiffs were certainly not misled as to the reality of
the transaction by the form which it took. Furthermore, plaintiffs were represented throughout by able counsel, and negotiated and executed the agreement after the Court's decision in
Forman and after several lower federal courts had specifically
ruled against plaintiffs position here. In short, this is not a case
where the economic reality approach should be compromised
66. Id. The case law opposing the emergent line is, on this point, in complete agreement. The associated characteristics of "stock," in conjunction with the focus and structure
of the transaction are, for these courts, conclusive as to the all important expectation of
protection. In Mifflin Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,734 at 98,851, for example, the expectation of the plaintiff was found to be
dictated by the following facts: the stock involved possessed all the traditional attributes,
the substance of the transaction was that stock, and the parties structured the transaction in
the form of a stock purchase agreement. That indicia, according to the Mifflin Court, mandated the conclusion that "It]he purchaser is entitled to the protection of the securities laws,
as is expected in thepurchase and sale of ordinarystock." Id. at 98,853 (emphasis added).
Associated characteristics of an instrument continue to be important in the eyes of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. In MutualService Cooperative [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 77,033, at 77,589 (SEC No Action Letter, July 27,
1981), the commission staff refused to issue "no action" advice in response to the proposition that shares of stock of a cooperative that acted as the fiscal agent for mutual insurance
companies were not "securities" under the definitional provision of the Securities Act of
1933. In support of the proposition that the shares of stock were not "securities," the following points were noted: (1) no dividends are paid; (2) limitation existed on the number
of shares that could be owned by a participant; (3) voting was not in proportion to share
ownership; (4) the shares had a nominal purchase price; (5) there was "little" opportunity
for gain; and (6) the issuer did not operate for profit. Nevertheless, the staff was unable to
agree that securities within the contemplation of the Securities Act were not involved because, under the articles of incorporation and by-laws of the issuing organization, the payment of dividends was permitted, whether or not done or likely in the future; the shares
could be transferred with approval of the issuer's board; and a "profit" potential did exist
See also Amicus Brief of the SEC, Golden, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 98,277 (filed Feb. 11, 1982) (correct interpretation of Forman is that use of the
"investment contract" test is appropriate in the case of shares of stock only where the stock
does not possess characteristics typically associated with that type of instrument).
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because of the reasonable expectations of the plaintiffs.

Thus, given different circumstances, a contrary result could
have been reached based on different expectations. Furthermore,
the Golden court noted that the reasoning and results in Tisch
Printing, Inc. v. Hastings' and M/flin Energy Sources, Inc. v.
Brooks,6 9 which upheld application of the federal securities laws,
were "not necessarily inconsistent with either the decision here or

with the general application of the economic reality test."' 70 Ac-

cording to the Golden court, "the reality of [those] transactions
was the purchase and sale of stock, with the acquisition of a business being incidental thereto."' 7 1 While the Golden court's attempt
to distinguish transactions in terms of what is "incidental thereto"

is useless and impracticable, the court unmistakably recognized
the existence of circumstances which demonstrate genuine "in-

vestment" characteristics despite the purchase being of 100% of a
company's outstanding stock. Above all, this recognition supports
a conclusion that no per se rule of law exists to deny securities law
protections simply because a 100% stock purchase is involved.
The courts' difficulties with articulating a test to separate "in-

vestment" transactions (to which federal securities laws apply)

from "commercial" transactions (to which they do not)7 2 have

tended towards analytical polarization: "literalism" on the one
67. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,277, at 91,773.
68. 456 F. Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978).
69. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %97,734 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
70. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,277, at 91,774.
71. Id. (emphasis added). The court observed:
[W]hile each of these opinions suggests a reading of Forman at odds with the
interpetation of this court and of defendant's authorities, the specific results in
these four [including Bronstein and Coffin] decisions are not necessarily inconsistent with either the decision here or with the general application of the economic
reality test. Id. (emphasis added). This is to say, unequivocally, that the
purchase of 100% of the outstanding stock of a corporation may, in total harmony
with "economic reality" analysis, involve the purchase of a "security" for purposes of federal securities law protection. The dilemma rendered so apparent by
this approach is that economic reality, like beauty, appears to lie in the eye of the
beholder.
72. The commercial/investment dichotomy has figured prominently in the persistent
question of whether a "note" or other debt instrument literally included within the definition of "security" are securities for purposes of securities law protections. Differing approaches have emerged in case law and, as underscored in Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F.
Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976), the analyses offered can be instructive in the instant inquiry.
The approaches have ranged from the unabashedly literal, Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v.
Central Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969), to the commercial/investment analysis, Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973), to the
"risk capitar' approach, Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir.
1976). These varying approaches led the Second Circuit to caution, in Exchange Nat'l
Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir. 1976), that:
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hand and per se "economic reality" on the other with nothing in
the middle. This Article seeks to fill that middle. In Somogyi v.
Butler,73 for example, the plaintiff had purchased a Volkswagen
dealership. After purchase, plaintiff incorporated the dealership
and received over 90% of the stock pursuant to an alleged arrangement predating the transaction.7 4 In connection with the exchange
of stock for the dealership assets, plaintiff claimed violations of
federal securities law antideception principles. The court rejected
plaintiff's argument that his "stock" possessed all traditional attributes and thus, was a "security" covered by the securities laws.
His argument was rejected because the court found the particular
facts of the transaction contained no characteristics essential to
coverage under the securities law."
So long as the statutes remain as they have been for over forty years, courts
had better not depart from their words without strong support for the conviction
that, under the authority vested in them by the "context" clause, they are doing
what Congress wanted when they refuse to do what it said.
The inquiry in Exchange National Bank concerned unsecured subordinated notes
"purchased" by a bank from a brokerage firm that subsequently became insolvent. Plaintiff invoked the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, seeking recovery on
claims that statements of financial condition prepared for the maker of the note were false
or misleading. Upon interlocutory appeal from an order denying defendant's motion to
dismiss on the "security" question, the Second Circuit confronted the commercial/investment dichotomy and found "rather appealing" the analysis of the concurring
judge in Great Western Bank & Trust, where the typical "investment situation" was described as one in which "the issuer has superior access to and controlof informationmaterial

to the investment decision." See 532 F.2d at 1262 (emphasis added). Just as importantly, in
Exchange NationalBank the Second Circuit, noting the frequent reference to the Howey
test per Forman, rejected its application--characterizing it as being of "dubious value" to
the particular inquiry. On the other hand, said the court, adoption of the "investment
situation" principle set forth above "would afford the hope of bringing a modicum of certainty into one large section of a field in bad need of it." 544 F.2d at 1137. The Second
Circuit's commentary on the real nature of an "investment situation" is particularly significant in its emphasis upon the disparate position vis-a-vis access to and control of material
facts. As noted earlier, this is the fundamental concern of federal securities law protections
and should in all cases determine the scope of their coverage.
73. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.(CCH) $398,281 at 91,788 (D.N.J.
1981).
74. Id. at 91,793. The plaintiff purchasee contended the purchase agreement, together
with other documents involved in the transaction "clearly reflects the fact that the Volkswagen dealership which I was purchasing from defendants Butler was to be organized as a
corporation with not less than $148,000 in capital stock issued." Id.
75. Not only did the Court conclude that the acquisition of stock by the plaintiff did
not fall within the ambit of securities law protections, "no other aspect of the commercial
dealings" between the parties did either. The transaction represented the acquisition of a
franchise,recognized to be outside the scope of securities laws except where the purchaser's
role in management is only "nominal or insignificant." This was not the case in Somogyi.
Id. at 91,800 n.16; see also Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); Howard
v. Chrysler Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,306, at
91,914 (D. Colo. 1977) ("stock" acquired in franchise transaction must be viewed as an
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The court concluded, based on an investment contract analysis, that plaintiff's "assets purchase" and contemporaneous formation of -a new corporation was not a "covered" securities
transaction.7 6 The court further opined:
[Tihe economic realities of plaintiffs "assets purchase" and incorporation lie at an even farther remove from the traditional
concerns of the federal securities laws than the transactions involved in the "stock purchase" cases. Here, although plaintiff
did acquire shares of stock, he did not acquire them from defendants. In effect he issued the shares to himself as a means of
limiting his liability to creditors and to the public at large.
Whether plaintiff had chosen to form a corporation or not, he
clearly would have been required to invest the same amount of
capital in the Volkswagen dealership as a condition of obtaining the franchise. By incorporating, plaintiff did not increase his risk by placing his money in the hands of others;
rather he reduced his risk by limiting his liability. Hence, even
though plaintiff may technically argue that he was a "purchaser" of statutorily defined "securities," he cannot, under
Forman's "economic realities" test, be said to have engaged in
to which Congress intended the securithe type of transaction
77
ties laws to apply.
Similarly, in Reprosystem v. SCM Corp.,78 plaintiff attempted
to invoke the antifraud provisions in connection with negotiation
and preparation of a subsequently abandoned agreement to
purchase the European photocopier business of the defendant.
The court was prompted to declare:
If the strict language of Section 10(b). . . and Rule lOb-5...
were to be applied automatically because a sale of securities
was contemplated, then virtually every sale of a business structured as was this transaction would call into play the panoply
of rights and remedies under the securities law. An examination of the essential purpose of such laws is required whenever
this outreach is sought.79
None of the putative "reality" cases, however, stands for the
proposition that purchase of 100% of the stock of a corporation
can never constitute purchase of a "covered" security. None of
the putative "literal" cases propose that stock is stock without any
further consideration. Whether articulated or not, both lines of
integral part of the management/investment "package" representing the dealership
franchise).
76. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,799.
77. Id. at 91,799-800 (footnotes omitted).
78. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,207, at 91,436
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
79. Id. at 91,449.
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cases necessarily focus upon the expectations of the participants in
a given set of circumstances which is undeniably the spirit, if not
the command, of Forman however one reads the two-part opinion.
Thus, the courts have clearly recognized, if not always fully articulated, that a purchaser of 100% of the stock of a corporation
may indeed be an investor with respect to that stock.
Moreover, the Frederickson v. Poloway ° line of cases denying

securities law protections to purchasers of all or most of a corporation's stock poses the danger of producing future absurd results
due to insensitive application of a unified Forman/Howey approach. For example, in Oakhill Cemeteiy of Hammond, Inc. v.

Tri-State Bank, s" the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, applying Frederiksen,held that a purchase
of 50% of the outstanding stock of a company, expressly accompanied by the right of control, did not constitute purchase of "stock"
within the ambit of the federal securities laws. In the same opinion, however, the court held that the acquisition of a note secured
by a pledge of the other 50% of the shares of that stock did constitute the purchase of a security. The purchase of the 50% interest
accompanying the right of control could not, according to the
court, be deemed the purchase of a security after Frederiksen. The
court ruled, however, that the note secured by a pledge of the remaining 50% interest constituted the purchase of a security
because:
[W]hen one parts with value and accepts securities as collateral
security for repayment, a "sale" of securities occurs within the
meaning of the securities laws. Rubin v. United States ....

Accordingly, one accepting such security has a remedy under
the federal securities laws for false representation as to the
value of that security.8"
The court's focus on Rubin v. UnitedStates 3 is significant because there the Supreme Court equated the economic reality of a
lender parting with value and accepting stock as collateral with
the risk an investor takes when purchasing stock. The Rubin Court
observed: "Both are relying on the value of the securities themselves, and both must be able to depend on the representations
made by the transferor of the securities . . ..

"I'

Equally impor-

tant was that Rubin involved the fundamental question of whether
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1981).
513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. I11. 1981).
Id. at 892 (footnote omitted).
449 U.S. 424 (1981).
449 U.S. at 431.
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the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws were applicable under the particular facts of the case. Indeed, there was no
jurisdictional challenge based upon the definition of "security."
Rather, the issue concerned the scope of coverage through interpretation of the statutorily defined term "sale," a term covered by
the same context qualifications as every other defined term.
The Supreme Court in Rubin held that a pledge of stock constituted a sale of that stock within the ambit of the statute, specifically the antifraud provisions." Applying a decidedly literal
approach, the Court noted: "When we find the terms of a statute
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except 'in rare and exceptional circumstances."' 6 The Court concluded that: "No such
circumstances are present here, for our reading of the statute is
wholly consistent with the history and purpose of the Securities
Act of 1933."'1
Against the backdrop of Rubin, so aptly highlighted in
Oakhill, a fundamental "economic reality" analysis is discernable.
The processes by which prospective purchasers of stock plus control determine the proper price of the stock by coming to know the
risk and return attributes of the corporation's business are just as
vulnerable to falsehoods and misinformation as are the processes
by which prospective holders of notes secured by stock determine
the proper value of their collateral. The reason for such equal
vulnerability of the two processes of information gathering is that
the seller is the source of the information in both cases.
Viewed in this light, acquisition of management control is irrelevant to whether protections of the securities laws should be
accorded. The value of the stock in either case is determined by
the ability of the enterprise to succeed in the future. The acquisition of future control is merely an element involved in making the
investment decision. As a mere element, it must be assessed
through information gathering like any other element bearing on
the valuation of the business. The prospect of future control does
not stand outside the potential purchaser's decision whether to
purchase and does not reduce vulnerability to falsehoods and misleading statements. The prospect of future control is merely an
element within the process.
85. The Court ruled that the sale qualified as a statutory "sale" under section 23(3) of
the Securities Act of 1933, and specifically under an antifraud provision of the Act, § 17(a).
See 449 U.S. at 431.
86. Id. at 638 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978)).
87. Id. at 430 (citations omitted).
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The Oakhill court's attempt to distinguish purchase of stock
from purchase of a note secured by stock is unpersuasive because
it fails to recognize the basic identity of the processes of purchaser
decisionmaking. In Oakhifl, the court attempted to distinguish the
"economic realities" of the two transactions by saying that the
pledge was not "intended to confer ownership and responsibility
for the day-to-day operations" of the issuer. 88 Such ownership and
responsibility, said the court, could not arise in the pledge situation until the event of a default on the terms of the note. Moreover, the court found that by reason of an acceleration provision
in the note which was keyed to the earnings of the issuer, the
transaction demonstrated "investment" characeristics. 89 As argued above, such distinctions are unfounded. The investment
character of a transaction is a function of risk, and is not determined by the presence or absence of a right to own and control an
enterprise. Furthermore, as Rubin pointed out, an investor assumes risk relying on the underlying value of the stock itself, and
depending upon information disclosed or available during the information gathering period. 9°
Thus, access to pre-decision information is the critical basis for
defense of application of the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws to purchases of all or substantially all of the stock
of a company. The fatal defect in any per se rule that would hold
otherwise is the failure to recognize the necessity for such access.
In valuing the stock, the purchaser must take into account the control entailed by the acquisition. The purchaser must assess the degree to which the control is meaningful in terms of hiring and
firing, changing lines of business, financing, revamping products
88. See 513 F. Supp. at 892.
89. Id. The court observed:
There is no evidence in the record that this [pledge] transaction was intended
to confer ownership and responsibility for the day day-to-day operations of
Oakhill upon Roark. Presumably, Roark did not obtain ownership of Oakhill
and responsibility for its operation until he exercised his option to demand title
and ownership of the securities after the Hannons defaulted upon their note.
Moreover, the terms of repayment on the note-providing for accelerated payment in the event Oakhill achieved a certain operating success-are indicia that
the transaction was of an investment as opposed to a commercial character.
It is also interesting to note in Oakhil that the court went on, fully embracing Rubin, to
observe that one accepting securities as collateral in a pledge transaction has a remedy
under federal securities law "for false representations as to the value of that security." Id.
These are the same securities which have been held not to support a federal claim in the
other aspects of the transaction--the only difference being the present conveyance of a
right to future control of the enterprise. One must ask, however, if the misrepresented
value of the security is any different because of that right.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
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and plants-in short, in changing the risk/return characteristics of
the business. The source of the information necessary to assess
the degree to which control is meaningful, however, is the seller.
Alternative sources of information may be lacking. Thus, the process of assessing the meaningfulness of control may be vulnerable
to information failure depending on the facts of the particular
deal. The particular circumstances critical to the issue are those
demonstrating disparity of access to material information affecting
value and reasonable reliance upon the seller to disclose material
facts. Where such circumstances exist, the transaction embodies
all the essential attributes of an investment, notwithstanding the
purchaser's ownership and managerial control after the transaction. The economic reality of the transaction is determined by
evaluation of the investment risk existing prior to, and simultaneous with, the point at which the investment decision is made, and
not by analysis of whether future profits will accrue from the managerial control of the purchaser. If the purchaser's stock valuation
calculus, taking future managerial control into account, is hampered because the evaluation is based upon information supplied
by the seller or publicly available to any investor but without the
advantage of equal access to all material information, the transaction is indistinguishable from any purchase of stock protected by
the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. Therefore, as a
matter of sound policy and commmon sense, those protections
should be available, and it is reasonable for purchasers in those
circumstances to expect such protections. 9
This is not to say that every transaction involving the purchase
of all or substantially all the stock of a corporation can or should
fall within the ambit of federal securities law protection. Considerations that preclude a prohibitory per se rule similarly preclude
an all-encompassing rule. The circumstances of a transaction
must be the determining factor, and the acquisition of the right to
future managerial control should be but one factor to be considered in the totality of circumstances. Across the board application
91. While reasonable expectations of protection under the securities laws have been
considered by some courts confronting the issue of coverage as a factor of some degree of
weight in the assessment of "economic reality," the recent decision in Seagrave Corp. v.
Vista Resources, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,469, at

92,748 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), firmly rejected any role for purchaser expectation in the process.
Holding that the transaction of issue only "involved a sale of a business in which stocks
were transferred as an indicia of ownership," the court addressed purchaser expectations
thus: "[Tihe expectations, subjective intentions and motivations of the parties do not deterld. at 92,751.
I..."
mine whether the federal securities laws apply .
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of the Howey "test" has demonstrated results focusing solely upon
some future right of control-all in the name of economic reality-which contradict the premise offered, and which largely ignore what a right of, or participation in, future control actually
represents. The issue of whether the purchase of all or substantially all of the stock of a corporation involves the purchase of a
"security" can be determined by neither literalism nor the Howey
"test." Stock is, in reality, stock for purposes of security transactions; and as to these characteristics neither literal coverage nor
glorification of future "control" can, or should, produce a
conclusion.
IV.

GOLDEN v<

GA4RoFoLo: THE SECOND CIRCUIT REACTS

The effective emergence of a per se rule of law-the "sale of
business doctrine"-following Frederiksenv. Poloway led to inevitable confrontation and reaction. Even in the Seventh Circuit the
breadth of the doctrine was challenged in McGrath v. Zenith Radio
Cop.,92 where the same court that championed the doctrine distingushed Frederiksen so as to uphold antifraud claims asserted by
the sellers of 100% of outstanding stock who claimed to have been
defrauded by the control-purchaser. The court explained that
Frederiksen was meant only to apply to the control-buying part of
a transaction, and that sellers should not be deprived of the protections of the federal securities laws. 93 Couching Frederiksen in
terms of strict buy side application the McGrath court left the doctrine intact, but clearly undermined its per se character by emphasizing the importance of circumstances. Further reaction to the
92. 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981).
93. The court approached Frederiksen as follows:
The dispositive factor in Frederiksenwas that "[t]he stock ...merely was passed
incidentally as an indicia of ownership of the business assets sold ... " Neither
in the hands of the sole shareholder/seller, nor in the hands of the purchaser...
did the purchase meet the requirements of the "economic reality" test. . . . In
McGrath, in contrast, the Basford shares were investments on the part of the individual employees who held those shares. The Basford shares constituted "securities" in the hands of plaintiff as well as the other sellers and they did not lose that
status merely by reason of the fact that all of the Basford shares were sold at the
same time. To conclude otherwise would be to hold that a purchaser of corporate
shares may deprive investor/sellers of the protections of the securities laws if it
can arrange that all of the corporation's shares are purchased at one time.
Whatever the beadth of language, clearly Frederiksen does not require such a
result.
651 F.2d at 468 n.5 (citations omitted). See also Stacy v. Rogers, [Current] FED. SEc. L.
REp. (CCH) 98,735, at 93,710 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (sale of business doctrine would not
require dismissal of claims by defrauded sellers of all or substantially all stock in a corporation against buyer of those shares).
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doctrine came in Golden v. Garololo,94 in which a divided Second

Circuit panel flatly rejected the doctrine.
Plaintiffs in Golden purchased 100% of the outstanding stock
of a corporation engaged in the ticket brokerage business. They
intended to manage the business directly. Plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant-seller made material misrepresentations to them as
to the value of the business and the value of the stock purchased,
and asserted claims under the antifraud provisions of the federal
court dismissed their claims under the
securities laws. The district
95
doctrine.
business
sale of
The Second Circuit reversed, holding quite simply that "conventional stock in business corporations is a security within the
meaning of the '33 and '34 Acts whether or not the underlying
the sale of a business to one who intends to
transaction involves
96
manage it."1

As previously discussed, 97 the fundamental fault of the sale of
business doctrine is the premise that the right of future control or
management is determinative of whether securities law protections should be available in transactions involving the acquisition
of that right. Concern over that faulty premise is apparent in the
Golden analysis:
So far as the antifraud policies of the Acts are concerned,
the possibilities of fraud and the ability to protect oneself
through contract are the same as to a "passive" investor buying

30% of a corporation's shares from a sole shareholder or an
"active" purchaser taking 100% and expecting to manage it
directly.98

The court was critical of distinctions between transactions on
the basis of commercial versus investment characteristics in sale of
business situations, pointing out that transfers of corporate control
frequently are motivated by a hope of capital appreciation and
94. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 1 98,656, at 93,275 (2d Cir. 1982).
95. 521 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
96. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 93,276.

97. See supra text accompanying note 46.
98. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), at 93,281. See also King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d
342 (11th Cir. 1982). In King the court applied the sale of business doctrine to affim
dismissal of securities law antifraud claims, but nevertheless offered this observation quite
consistent with the Golden view as to necessary protection:
It is apparent that the approach used here is not a function of numbers. A sale

of less than 100% of the stock might not be covered by the Acts. A sale of 100% of
the stock can be covered by the Acts. The number of sellers and purchasers will

not necessarily control the outcome.
id. at 346.
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future value.99 In the end, according to the court, it is the statutory
language that must control, and the statutory definition of "security" construed to include all instruments having commonly agreed
upon characteristics, such as "stock," should control. Contrary to
Frederiksen, the Golden court viewed Forman as compelling that
result.
A prominent and essential predicate for the sale of business
doctrine is the proposition that the Forman view of "economic reality" requires application of Howey investment contract analysis
to every situation, even if the instrument involved possesses traditional corporate stock attributes.' 00 This view presumes no separate significance to the two parts of the Forman opinon. Golden,
however, emphasized the separate, alternative, analysis of the Forman court to support its conclusion:
We think the term "stock" in this definition of "security" in
the '33 and '34 Acts should be read to include instruments, such
as these, which have the characteristics associated with ordinary, conventional shares of stock. There was little reason for
the drafters to use words such as "stock," "treasury stock" or
"voting-trust certificate", unless their intention was to include
all such instruments as commonly defined. If an "economic reality" test were intended, reference to such specific types of instruments, and common variations of them, would have been
inappropriate because a substantial portion of each class of instrument would, in fact, not be within the definition. We believe that Congress intended to draft an expansive definition
and to include with specificity all instruments with characteristics agreed upon in the commercial world, such as "debentures," "stock," "treasury stock" or "voting-trust certificates."
Catch-all phrases such as "investment contract," were then included to cover unique instruments not easily classified. If the
"economic reality" test were to be the core of the definition,
only general catch-all terms would have been used.' 0
Golden's rejection of the sale of business doctrine came over
the strong dissent of Judge Lumbard who urged that the Forman
test was not two-part and that economic reality compelled application of the doctrine. Most prominent among the points offered
in dissent, however, was the observation that the particular plaintiffs did not need the protections of the securities laws. The absence of need, according to Judge Lumbard, was a function of the
plaintiffs' ability and position to inspect the business, to obtain
99. Id.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 31-45.
101. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 98,656, at 93,279-80.

19821

FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

specific contractural warranties and representations regarding the
business' tangible and intangible assets, and the fact that they obtained "full operational control from the moment they signed the
purchase agreement."' 1 2 This is to say that the plaintiffs were in a
position to affect significantly the risk associated with their investment decision.
Though Golden bespeaks of the literal school, its message is
more substantive: the protections of the federal securities laws are
not to be limited by vague notions of post-transaction control.
That fundamental proposition is as much a reflection of economic
reality as it is of literal application of the statutory definitions. It is
in actuality the sale of business doctrine that has emerged a
wooden and literal approach, and the reaction evidenced in
Golden was inevitable. The Seventh Circuit offered its rejoinder
in Sutter v. Groen, 03 in which this Article's thesis emerges
prominently.
In Sutter, the court reexamined its pronouncement in Frederiksen in light of the Second Circuit's rejection of the sale of business
doctrine in Golden. Although it reatrmed the Frederiksen principle, the court vacated a summary judgment dismissing the federal
securities law claims and remanded the case to allow the presumption of control to be rebutted by a showing that the main purpose
of the transaction was investment.
At issue in Sutter was the claim by a 70% stolkholder of a
corporation, Happy Radio, that he purchased stock concurrently
with and only because Happy Radio was itself purchasing 100% of
the stock of Bret Broadcasting from the defendant. Plaintiff alleged that his stock purchase was made in reliance upon misrepresentations by the defendant concerning the value of Bret
Broadcasting stock. Defendant asserted the sale of business doctrine, and the Seventh Circuit framed the essential inquiry as
whether the plaintiff was an entrepreneur or an investor in the
transactions.
Though the court undertook a scholarly analysis of the distinction between entrepreneur and investor status based on active
managerial control versus passive stock ownership, it conceded
that the allegations were consistent with either conclusion. Indeed, Judge Posner offered: "This would be that exquisitely
mixed case that the Second Circuit despaired of being able to de102. Id. at 93,283-84.
103. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

98,783 at 94,015 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Concluding that despair was premature, the court re-

manded the case for reconsideration by the district court under
the following presumption:
If,
as in this case (the complaint alleges that Sutter owns 70
percent of the common stock of Happy Radio), the purchaser
already has, or by the purchase in question acquires, more than
50 percent of the common stock of the corporation, his purpose
in purchasing the stock will be presumed to have been entrepreneurship rather than investment. 10 5
Thus the per se rule has come full circle. The Sutter court has

directed factual inquiry into each transaction using the presumption saying, "[i]t makes the 'economic reality' test of Frederiksen
a little more concrete and thereby meets the Second Circuit's
concern with the difficulty of drawing lines." 10 6 The progenitor of
the per se rule has effectively conceded its shortcomings and di-

rected the precise inquiry that must be made in any set of
circumstances.
V.

CONCLUSION

The securities laws protect investment decisions by assuring
the availability of adequate information for investment decisionmaking and by providing liberalized antifraud remedies in the
event of deception. The disparity of access to material information and the vulnerability of investor valuation processes to misinformation are sound bases for application of the federal securities
laws. The number of shares purchased is not determinative. The
purchase of one share or 100% of the shares of a corporation does

not affect the need for protection in these circumstances. 107

s/

104. Id. at 94,019.
105. Id.
106. Id. The court specifically declined to consider the question of the sale of business
doctrine as applied to purchases of 50% of less of a corporation's stock which was, of
course, the subject of a constitutent district court decision. See Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. In. 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 81-82 for a discussion of Oakh1ll.
107. Although a pre-Forman analysis, the observation in Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat
Ryan & Associates, Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1263 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974),
retains vitality on this point:
The application of Section 10(b) cannot depend on whether the purchaser of stock
buys a small interest, a controlling interest, or all of the stock, of a corporation.
Such a standard would be difficult to apply and create a capricious basis for dispensing the protection of Section 10(b). The Court finds no reason for reading
the Securities Exchange Act in a manner that provides coverage of the small investor, but not the large one. Such a construction would fly in the face of the
remedial purposes of the Act. In one sense the large investor has a more pressing
need for protection to the extent that he has expended a greater amount of his
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The bevy of cases to confront this issue have produced conclusions on both sides but have demonstrated little reasoned analysis
of the genuine "realities" of the situations put before them. The
absence of factual analysis is acute, and the perceived desirability
of a pervasive rule apparent. Neither is appropriate, and it is Forman above all that compels that conclusion. While a settled rule
of law may be desirable, the history of application of the federal
securities laws is rife with fluid analyses undertaken to effectuate
congressional purposes. Frederiksen, Golden and all of the cases
confronting the issue have sought to do likewise, and the polarity
of their respective approaches now literally mandates ultimate resolution. That resolution should not come as an adoption of one
perceived school of thought over the other, for there are really no
separate schools. What is needed instead is a fundamental restatement of application and purpose. In Golden, the court called upon
Congress to act if it is dissatisfied with the present scope of the
Acts. Others will undoubtedly call upon the Supreme Court to
address the issue. The result, however accomplished, must be
based upon recognition of the fundamental elements of a "security" and the undisputed focus for over four decades on the object
of protection: an investment decision.

resources. It is entirely irrelevant that the parties could have conducted their business transaction without the use of stock. The plain fact is that they d not
choose to use the stock.
496 F.2d at 1263.

